Malicious IcedID AdFind Active Directory Reconnaissance via Command Line

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-04
Updated
2026-10-04

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of the AdFind utility used to enumerate Active Directory objects, trusts and subnets. This behavior is associated with IcedID hands-on-keyboard reconnaissance preceding Quantum ransomware deployment. Operators use AdFind to map the domain before lateral movement, making its presence in interactive sessions a strong hunting signal.

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Windows Process Creation: Renamed AdFind.exe Executions
PowerShell: Active Directory computer enumeration via Get-AdComputer
Windows Process Creation: AdFind Executed with Suspicious Recon Flags
Windows Process Creation: Execution of Net.exe or Net1.exe
Suspicious ADFind Active Directory Enumeration (via process_creation)
Malicious IcedID AdFind Active Directory Reconnaissance via Command Line
Pivot detection · T1087.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.