Malicious Inhibit System Recovery via Native Backup and Shadow Copy Deletion (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-25
Updated
2026-09-25

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects the multi stage campaign destroying recovery options by disabling the Windows Recovery Environment with reagentc, deleting the backup catalog with wbadmin and removing volume shadow copies with vssadmin before ransomware deployment. Executing these recovery inhibiting commands together is a strong pre encryption signal.

Related detections9 linkedT1490 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Termite Ransomware Shadow Copy Deletion via Vssadmin (via process_creation)
Malicious ESXi Virtual Machine Termination via esxcli Before Encryption
Malicious Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC (via process_creation)
Malicious Backup and Recovery Destruction Chain via Dire Wolf Ransomware (via process_creation)
Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion for Ransomware Recovery Inhibition
Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via wmic and vssadmin (via process_creation)
Malicious System Recovery Inhibition via bcdedit and vssadmin in Mallox
Malicious Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC via Process Creation (via process_creation)
Suspicious Anti-Recovery Zeroing via fsutil setZeroData (via process_creation)
Malicious Inhibit System Recovery via Native Backup and Shadow Copy Deletion (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1490 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.