Malicious KB Document Masqueraded Executable Spawned by Script Interpreter via RoKRAT Loader (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-27
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of an executable named to impersonate a Windows KB update document such as KB400928_doc.exe when launched by cmd.exe or powershell.exe, as seen in the APT37 ToyBox Story cmd to powershell to payload chain delivering RoKRAT. The KB prefix with a _doc.exe suffix masquerades the payload as a benign document while it runs as a program. Catching this masqueraded binary being spawned by a script interpreter exposes the final loader execution stage.

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Malicious KB Document Masqueraded Executable Spawned by Script Interpreter via RoKRAT Loader (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1059.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.