Malicious Local Administrator Added by Atera RMM Agent

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-22
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the AteraAgent process spawning net.exe to add an account to the local administrators group, an abuse chain Huntress observed during bulk attacks leveraging RMM tools against MSP-managed endpoints. Attackers who gain access to an RMM tenant push commands that create privileged accounts for persistence. Privileged account changes originating from an RMM agent are a strong indicator of tenant abuse.

Related detections9 linkedT1136.001 — drag to rearrange
Possible Next.js Middleware Auth Bypass via X-Middleware-Subrequest Header (CVE-2025-29927)
Malicious Dynamicweb Unauthenticated Administrator Creation via Setup Default.aspx (via webserver)
Suspicious Hidden Backdoor Account Creation Ending With Dollar Sign (via process_creation)
Suspicious Brutforce with Denied Access Due to Account Restrictions Policies (via security)
Suspicious Success Login Attempt on a Windows OpenSSH Server (via security)
Malicious User Creation via Commandline (via process_creation)
Suspicious Local Account Creation and Privileged Group Addition via Net.EXE (via process_creation)
Suspicious Hidden Local Account Creation via Dscl (via process_creation)
Suspicious SQL Server - Connection Attempt Using a Disabled Account (via application)
Malicious Local Administrator Added by Atera RMM Agent
Pivot detection · T1136.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.