Malicious Local Group Membership Change (via powershell)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Service
powershell
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-06
Updated
2026-11-06

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects if a member is added to a local group via PowerShell.

Related detections9 linkedT1098 — drag to rearrange
Malicious New Member Added to an "OCS/Lync/Skype for Business" Administration Group - High Risk (via security)
Malicious New Member Added to a "OCS/Lync/Skype for Business" Administration Group - Low Risk (via security)
Suspicious AWS Console Login Profile Creation for Persistence (via cloudtrail)
Suspicious Bapak AWS EC2 ImportKeyPair With Known Attacker Key Names via CloudTrail
Suspicious EKS Access Entry Creation via CloudTrail
Suspicious Kerberos Constrained Delegation Configuration via msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo
Malicious Domain and Enterprise Admins Group Addition via net group Domain Add (via process_creation)
Suspicious Route53 Domain Transfer Lock Disabled via Scattered Spider Technique
Suspicious Domain Admin Account Creation via net (via process_creation)
Malicious Local Group Membership Change (via powershell)
Pivot detection · T1098 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.