Malicious macOS.Gaslight Persistence via Apple-Namespace LaunchAgent (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
macos
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-14
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of the LaunchAgent property list that the macOS.Gaslight Rust backdoor uses for persistence, masquerading inside the Apple com.apple namespace with the label com.apple.system.services.activity. Genuine Apple daemons are not installed as user LaunchAgents under this exact label. Its presence indicates the Gaslight implant is establishing persistence.

Related detections9 linkedT1543.001 — drag to rearrange
LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon Persistence File Creation on macOS (via file_event)
Suspicious Persistence Load via Launchctl (via process_creation)
Masquerading Cuckoo Stealer LaunchAgent Masquerading as Homebrew Updater (via file_event)
Malicious Mini Shai-Hulud gh-token-monitor Persistence Service (via file_event)
Suspicious LaunchAgent Masquerading as coreaudiod (via file_event)
Suspicious LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon Load via launchctl
Suspicious macOS LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon Plist Creation
Suspicious macOS Persistence via launchctl submit (via process_creation)
Suspicious macOS Trojan-Proxy LaunchAgent GoogleHelperUpdater Persistence (via file_event)
Malicious macOS.Gaslight Persistence via Apple-Namespace LaunchAgent (via file_event)
Pivot detection · T1543.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.