Malicious macOS LaunchAgent Persistence via Masqueraded com.apple hcpi Property List

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
macos
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-27
Updated
2026-09-27

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a LaunchAgent property list that masquerades as an Apple system component using a com.apple prefix combined with an hcpi identifier. The MacSync RAT reverse engineered by Huntress installed persistence as a com.apple.<hex>.hcpi.plist LaunchAgent to survive reboots while blending in with legitimate Apple agents. The mismatch between the trusted-looking name and the user-writable LaunchAgents path is a strong persistence indicator.

Related detections9 linkedT1543.001 — drag to rearrange
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LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon Persistence File Creation on macOS (via file_event)
Suspicious Persistence Load via Launchctl (via process_creation)
Masquerading Cuckoo Stealer LaunchAgent Masquerading as Homebrew Updater (via file_event)
Malicious Mini Shai-Hulud gh-token-monitor Persistence Service (via file_event)
Suspicious LaunchAgent Masquerading as coreaudiod (via file_event)
Suspicious LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon Load via launchctl
Suspicious macOS LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon Plist Creation
Malicious macOS LaunchAgent Persistence via Masqueraded com.apple hcpi Property List
Pivot detection · T1543.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.