Malicious ManagementMailboxPicker Webshell Written by Diplomatic Specter

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-18
Updated
2026-10-18

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the creation of the ManagementMailboxPicker.aspx webshell used by the Operation Diplomatic Specter campaign to maintain access to compromised Exchange and web servers. The webshell provides persistent remote command execution and staging for mailbox theft. Detecting its file creation exposes server-side persistence and hands-on access by the espionage actor.

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Malicious ManagementMailboxPicker Webshell Written by Diplomatic Specter
Pivot detection · T1505.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.