Malicious Matanbuchus C2 Beacon via Spoofed Skype User-Agent (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-10
Updated
2026-11-10

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects outbound HTTPS requests using the spoofed Skype User-Agent embedded in the Matanbuchus 3.0 loader for command-and-control. Adversaries leverage a hardcoded fake Skype client string with an AppleWebKit fragment to disguise beacon traffic as legitimate application activity, making early detection critical for exposing the loader channel before secondary payloads are fetched and executed.

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Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.