Malicious Mimikatz Driver Deployed via Service (via security)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-02
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects installs the Mimikatz driver to bypass the LSA protected mode (RunAsPPL) and dump LSASS process content.

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Malicious Mimikatz Driver Deployed via Service (via security)
Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.