Malicious MOVEit Transfer Exploitation via X-siLock HTTP Headers (via webserver)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
webserver
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-05
Updated
2026-10-05

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Persistence
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Priv Esc

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects inbound HTTP requests carrying the X-siLock-Step1 or X-siLock-Step3 headers used by the MOVEit Transfer exploit toolkit. These custom headers drive the CVE-2023-34362 exploitation flow and indicate an attacker interacting with the human2.aspx web shell to exfiltrate data.

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Malicious MOVEit Transfer Exploitation via X-siLock HTTP Headers (via webserver)
Pivot detection · T1190 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.