Malicious NetSupport RAT Client32 Execution

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-10
Updated
2026-09-10

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of client32.exe the NetSupport Manager remote-control client binary from a user-writable directory. Threat actors repackaged NetSupport Manager as a RAT delivered through fake browser update lures in this campaign. NetSupport client32 running from temp or profile paths rather than an installed program directory indicates abuse for unauthorized remote access.

Related detections9 linkedT1219 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Atera Agent Silent Onboarding via Process Creation
Suspicious Remote Access Tool User Agent in Outbound Traffic via Proxy
Suspicious ScreenConnect Remote Access Binary Running Under a Renamed Executable
Malicious Silent AteraAgent RMM Installation via IntegratorLogin
Possible Remote Monitoring and Management Tool Abuse for Remote Access
Suspicious NetSupport Manager Client Executing From ProgramData via Process Creation (via process_creation)
Malicious PowerShell Download Cradle Spawned by Quick Assist
Suspicious AnyDesk Unattended Password Set via Piped Echo
Suspicious Remote Monitoring Tool Executing from GoAnywhere Directory
Malicious NetSupport RAT Client32 Execution
Pivot detection · T1219 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.