Malicious NimDoor Loader Persistence via Masqueraded Google Updater (via file_event)

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1543.001Launch Agent
Priv Esc
- T1543.001Launch Agent
Defense Evasion
- T1036Masquerading
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the NimDoor loader binary that DPRK actors dropped under Application Support while impersonating a Google updater, using a capital letter I in place of the lowercase l in the file name GoogIe LLC. The loader launches the CoreKitAgent trojan and installs a LaunchAgent for persistence. The homoglyph file name is a reliable indicator of this macOS implant.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1036 — drag to rearrange

Suspicious Rename of Double-Extension PowerShell Script (via process_creation)

Suspicious Cobalt Strike OCSP Malleable C2 Profile Traffic

Suspicious Spoofed Microsoft Host Header C2 by Stately Taurus

Suspicious Double Extension Image Executable by Fighting Ursa

Malicious XCSSET Payload Drop to Temp and Hidden Home Paths

Malicious Lotus Wiper Masqueraded Binary Execution from lotus Directory (via process_creation)

Suspicious Safari-Masquerading LaunchAgent Loaded via launchctl on macOS

Suspicious Tusk Loader Execution from AppData AD_Security Directory

Suspicious OneDrive Masquerading TLB Marker File in ProgramData

Malicious NimDoor Loader Persistence via Masqueraded Google Updater (via file_event)

Pivot detection · T1036 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

Full detection rule

Unlock this rule to view and copy it

The detection logic is included with a plan. Everything else — context, mappings and implementation details — stays free on this page.

Sign in for 3 free unlocks

Signing in gives you 3 unlocks to spend on any rule in the library. No card, and they do not expire.

Also included

Unlocked rules convert on this page — to Splunk SPL or Splunk — Raw Index SPL or Microsoft Sentinel KQL or Microsoft Sentinel ASIM ASIM KQL or Microsoft Defender XDR KQL or Elastic Security KQL or Elastic Security Lucene or Elastic Security ES|QL or CrowdStrike Falcon CQL or SentinelOne PowerQuery or Palo Alto Cortex XDR XQL or Carbon Black Cloud Platform Search or Carbon Black EDR Process Search or Google Security Operations UDM Search or IBM QRadar AQL or Sumo Logic Cloud SIEM Rules expression or Rapid7 InsightIDR LEQL or Graylog Search or OpenSearch Lucene or OpenSearch PPL PPL or Grafana Loki LogQL or SQLite SQL or Zircolite SQLite — with the log-source profile the engine picked, the field map it used, and everything it could not express. Converting a rule you have unlocked costs no further credit.

See it run on a free rule →Convert your own rule →