Malicious node Reverse Shell Spawned on FortiGate via Inline Code

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-04
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Persistence

  4. Priv Esc

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the node binary being executed with the -e flag to run inline JavaScript, matching the reverse shell payload delivered through the FortiGate CVE-2024-21762 exploitation described by Assetnote. Attackers use node -e to establish an outbound interactive shell from the appliance after triggering the memory corruption. Inline node execution on a network security appliance is highly abnormal and indicates post-exploitation activity.

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Malicious node Reverse Shell Spawned on FortiGate via Inline Code
Pivot detection · T1190 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.