Malicious NTDS.dit Extraction from Volume Shadow Copy via GLOBALROOT

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-02
Updated
2026-11-02

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects copying of the Active Directory NTDS.dit database from a volume shadow copy referenced through the GLOBALROOT device path as seen in the Nearest Neighbor Attack. Extracting NTDS.dit exposes all domain credential hashes. Successful theft enables full domain compromise.

Related detections9 linkedT1003.003 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Active Directory Snapshot Creation via ntdsutil
Malicious NTDS Credential Dump via Ntdsutil IFM Snapshot (via process_creation)
Malicious NTDS Database Dump via ntdsutil
Malicious NTDS Extraction from Volume Shadow Copy by RA World
Malicious NTDS Extraction via ntdsutil IFM
Malicious NTDS.dit Access via Shadow Copy GLOBALROOT Path
Suspicious Shadow Copy Creation via WMIC (via process_creation)
Malicious NTDS Extraction via Ntdsutil IFM
Malicious NTDS.dit Credential Extraction via ntdsutil
Malicious NTDS.dit Extraction from Volume Shadow Copy via GLOBALROOT
Pivot detection · T1003.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.