Malicious NTDS Extraction from Volume Shadow Copy by RA World

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-19
Updated
2026-10-19

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects copying of the Active Directory database or SAM and SYSTEM hives out of a volume shadow copy through a GLOBALROOT HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy path, a credential theft step used by the RA World ransomware group. Reading domain secrets from a shadow copy bypasses locks on the live files. Detecting this exposes domain credential harvesting ahead of ransomware deployment.

Related detections9 linkedT1003.002 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Access via Mklink to GLOBALROOT
Malicious Credential Hive Copy from Volume Shadow Copy
Windows Print.EXE Sensitive File Dump for Credential Access
Windows File Events: NTDS.DIT Created by Suspicious or Rare Process
Zeek SMB: Network Share File Transfers of Credential-Related Filenames
Zeek SMB Files: Impacket SecretDump Access to ADMIN$ and System32 .tmp Droppers
Windows Credential Dump Tool Artifacts Written to Disk via File Events
Windows Volume Shadow Copy Symlink Creation Using mklink
Windows Network Share File Transfers Targeting Credential and Memory Dump Paths
Malicious NTDS Extraction from Volume Shadow Copy by RA World
Pivot detection · T1003.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.