Malicious Nx Postinstall Secret Harvesting to Inventory File (s1ngularity Supply Chain)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-05
Updated
2026-11-05

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a process writing to the /tmp/inventory.txt path used by the malicious nx postinstall telemetry payload to stage harvested secrets. It matters because this file collects credentials and tokens from developer machines before exfiltration in the s1ngularity supply chain attack.

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Malicious Nx Postinstall Secret Harvesting to Inventory File (s1ngularity Supply Chain)
Pivot detection · T1552.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.