Malicious OAuth Application Granted Full Mailbox and EWS Permissions (via m365)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
m365
Service
audit
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-25
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects OAuth application permission grants for high privilege mailbox scopes such as full_access_as_app EWS.AccessAsUser.All and ApplicationImpersonation. Midnight Blizzard granted these permissions to attacker-controlled applications to access mailboxes across the tenant.

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Suspicious ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned to Mailbox Principal (via m365)
Suspicious OAuth Application Consent Granted High Privilege Mail Scopes (via m365)
Suspicious Token Request Using Microsoft Authentication Broker Client to Obtain Primary Refresh Token (via azure)
Suspicious Salesforce Connected App OAuth Authorization from VPN Egress
Suspicious M365 Device Code Authentication Flow via m365
Malicious OAuth Application Granted Full Mailbox and EWS Permissions (via m365)
Pivot detection · T1528 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.