Malicious Office Application Loading a User-Path DLL via Regsvr32 or Rundll32 (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-05
Updated
2026-09-05

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a Microsoft Office application spawning regsvr32 or rundll32 to load a DLL from a user-writable path such as AppData, Temp or ProgramData, the macro-driven loader pattern used by families like Emotet to execute their payload after a malicious document is opened. This document-to-DLL execution chain is documented in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report. Detecting the Office-to-DLL proxy execution surfaces the intrusion at the initial-access boundary.

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Malicious Office Application Loading a User-Path DLL via Regsvr32 or Rundll32 (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1204.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.