Malicious Panamorfi DDoS JAR Execution via Java (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-11
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects the Panamorfi campaign running its Java payloads conn.jar and mineping.jar after compromising an exposed Jupyter notebook. conn.jar connects to a Discord channel for command and control while mineping.jar launches TCP flood denial of service attacks. These jar names are unique to the campaign.

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Malicious Panamorfi DDoS JAR Execution via Java (via process_creation)
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.