Malicious Phantom Taurus OutlookEN Web Shell File Creation (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-20
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of the OutlookEN.aspx web shell dropped by Phantom Taurus on compromised Exchange and IIS servers. The web shell loads the NET-STAR IIServerCore backdoor into the worker process to provide persistent server access. Detecting the file drop catches the initial foothold before the backdoor is loaded into memory.

Related detections9 linkedT1505.003 — drag to rearrange
Malicious IIS Worker Process Spawning Command Shell for Webshell Reconnaissance (via process_creation)
Malicious Command Shell Spawned by SQL Server via Process Creation (via process_creation)
Suspicious PHP Webshell Access with Hardcoded Key
Suspicious IIS Configuration Reconnaissance via Appcmd (via process_creation)
Malicious ManagementMailboxPicker Webshell Written by Diplomatic Specter
Malicious MOVEit human2 Webshell File Creation via file_event
Suspicious Double-Extension Web Shell Upload via Nagios XI Custom Includes
Suspicious Malicious WAR Deployment via GlassFish Admin Console
Suspicious JSP Webshell Compiled Class Creation in Web Application Work Directory
Malicious Phantom Taurus OutlookEN Web Shell File Creation (via file_event)
Pivot detection · T1505.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.