Malicious PHASEJAM Webshell Dropped in Ivanti dana-na Auth Directory

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-04
Updated
2026-11-04

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Persistence
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Priv Esc

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects webshell files being written under the Ivanti Connect Secure /dana-na/ authentication path which is where the PHASEJAM webshell was dropped during in-the-wild exploitation of CVE-2025-0282 and CVE-2025-0283. This is important because these appliance web directories should not receive new CGI or PHP scripts so a write here is a high confidence sign of successful zero-day exploitation and webshell persistence on the VPN gateway.

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Suspicious Single-Character Named Executable Launched by Web Server Process (via process_creation)
Malicious MOVEit human2.aspx Web Shell Dropped in wwwroot (via file_event)
Malicious PHASEJAM Webshell Dropped in Ivanti dana-na Auth Directory
Pivot detection · T1190 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.