Malicious PIPEDANCE Named Pipe Command and Control Channel via Pipe Created

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
pipe_created
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-17
Updated
2026-09-17

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of the hardcoded PIPEDANCE named pipe used as an inter-process SMB command and control channel where the pipe name doubles as the RC4 key u0hxc1q44vhhbj5oo4ohjieo8uh7ufxe. PIPEDANCE uses this pipe to relay operator commands for shellcode injection and token hijacking so its presence indicates active backdoor communication.

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Pivot detection · T1071.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.