Malicious Registry Hive Theft from Shadow Copy via Print LOLBIN

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-29
Updated
2026-09-29

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects print.exe copying files from a volume shadow copy device path referencing GLOBALROOT, HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy, or a @GMT snapshot UNC path, a LOLBIN abuse technique documented by Huntress for stealing SAM and SYSTEM hives. Attackers use the print utility to read locked credential stores from a shadow copy without triggering hive-export tooling. This file-copy pattern via print.exe is highly anomalous and indicates credential-store theft.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.