Malicious Remote Process Creation via WMI Win32_Process

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-25
Updated
2026-09-25

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects use of WMI to create a process through the Win32_Process class from wmic or a script host, an execution technique observed in a MuddyWater APT campaign targeting the Middle East to run payloads while evading direct process lineage. It captures lateral or local execution driven through the WMI provider. Detecting this is important because Win32_Process Create invocations are a frequent attacker method to launch code outside normal parent-child relationships.

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Malicious Remote Process Creation via WMI Win32_Process
Pivot detection · T1047 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.