huntrule

Malicious Remote Process Creation via WMI Win32_Process

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-25
Updated
2026-09-25
AnalysisDetection

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects use of WMI to create a process through the Win32_Process class from wmic or a script host, an execution technique observed in a MuddyWater APT campaign targeting the Middle East to run payloads while evading direct process lineage. It captures lateral or local execution driven through the WMI provider. Detecting this is important because Win32_Process Create invocations are a frequent attacker method to launch code outside normal parent-child relationships.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1047 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious WMI Provider Host Spawning Explorer or wlrmdr via Process Creation
Suspicious Remote Process Creation and Admin Share Copy via WMIC and Xcopy
Suspicious WMI Query Against Windows Defender Namespace via wmic (via process_creation)
Lateral Movement via WMIC Remote Process Creation
Malicious UAT-8302 Remote Process Execution via wmic
Malicious Remote Encryptor Execution via WMIC Process Call Create (Chaos Ransomware)
Malicious Impacket Wmiexec Remote Command Execution Pattern
Malicious Shadow Copy Deletion Via WMI
Suspicious Remote Process Creation via WMIC Process Call Create (via process_creation)
Malicious Remote Process Creation via WMI Win32_Process
Pivot detection · T1047 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.