Malicious rundll32 IternalJob Export Spawned by wscript (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-15
Updated
2026-10-15

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects wscript.exe spawning rundll32.exe to call the IternalJob export, the execution chain used by the BumbleBee loader launched from a VBS script via a scheduled task. The misspelled IternalJob export name is a specific loader artifact. This chain proxies malicious code execution through a signed binary to load BumbleBee and stage follow-on payloads.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.