Malicious Rundll32 Loading an Export From a User Path (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-04
Updated
2026-09-04

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects rundll32.exe executing a named or ordinal export from a DLL located in AppData, ProgramData or Temp, the execution behavior IcedID and Bumblebee use to run a downloaded loader. Rundll32 export execution from user-writable paths is a defense-evasion technique tracked in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report. Detecting these invocations surfaces malware loaders running under a signed binary.

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Malicious Rundll32 Loading an Export From a User Path (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1218.011 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.