Malicious Scheduled Task Running svchost32 Proxy from Windows Temp

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-01
Updated
2026-10-01

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Cred Access

  5. Discovery

  6. Lateral Movement

  7. Collection

  8. Exfiltration

  9. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects schtasks creating a task that launches svchost32.exe from the Windows Temp directory, a masquerading socks proxy component observed in the Huntress-analyzed Gentlemen ransomware intrusion. The binary mimics the legitimate svchost name but runs from a non-standard path to establish proxied command-and-control. Creation of this task combines masquerading, persistence, and tunneling into a high-confidence indicator.

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Malicious Scheduled Task Running svchost32 Proxy from Windows Temp
Pivot detection · T1053.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.