Malicious Self-Signed TLS Certificate With Exploit Subject via Zeek X509

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
zeek
Service
x509
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-10
Updated
2026-09-10

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects TLS certificates whose subject or issuer contains the literal exploit organizational value used by the self-signed certificate in the UAT-7810 ORB-network campaign reported by Cisco Talos. The DOGLEASH and LONGLEASH implants wrap their reverse-shell and proxy traffic in this hardcoded certificate. Matching the certificate subject reveals encrypted command-and-control channels regardless of the rotating C2 IP addresses.

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Malicious Self-Signed TLS Certificate With Exploit Subject via Zeek X509
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.