Malicious Service ACL Tampering via Sc Sdset (via process_creation)

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1543.003Windows Service
Priv Esc
- T1543.003Windows Service
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects use of sc sdset to rewrite a service security descriptor, hardening a malicious service against inspection or removal. Observed in the BADIIS SEO poisoning campaign analyzed by Elastic Security Labs where the WalletServiceInfo service ACL is tampered to protect the implant for defense evasion and persistence.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1543.003 — drag to rearrange

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Malicious Service DLL Hijack for Persistence via Lotus Blossom

Malicious TinyTurla ServiceDll Registration via svchost Group (via registry_set)

Suspicious ToyMaker LAGTOY Service Creation Masquerading as WmiPrvSV via sc.exe

Malicious Service Creation With Autostart binPath via sc.exe (via process_creation)

Malicious svchost Service Creation for TinyTurla Persistence (via process_creation)

Malicious Service Creation Masquerading as nslookup (via process_creation)

Malicious Service ACL Tampering via Sc Sdset (via process_creation)

Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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