Malicious Service Creation for DcRAT Persistence via sc.exe (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-07
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects use of sc.exe to create the MixedSvc service pointing at a masqueraded Mixed Reality.exe binary under the Windows Media Player folder, the persistence mechanism used by Operation DragonReturn to survive reboots. The actor abused Windows service control to auto-start its DcRAT loader with SYSTEM privileges, making this a high-value chokepoint for catching the intrusion before code injection into svchost.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.