Malicious Shadow Copy Deletion Via WMI

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-10
Updated
2026-09-10

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects PowerShell querying Win32_Shadowcopy and piping the result to Remove-WmiObject to delete volume shadow copies. Akira ransomware used Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy piped to Remove-WmiObject to destroy shadow copies before encryption. Deleting shadow copies is an inhibit-recovery action that prevents victims from restoring files without paying the ransom.

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Pivot detection · T1047 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.