Malicious Shadow Copy Deletion via WMI PowerShell (via ps_script)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
ps_script
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-05
Updated
2026-10-05

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects PowerShell that queries the Win32_Shadowcopy WMI class and then deletes the returned instances. Ransomware uses this WMI approach to remove Volume Shadow Copies without invoking vssadmin, evading command-line detections focused on that utility. Scripted shadow copy destruction through WMI is a clear recovery-inhibition behavior.

Related detections9 linkedT1490 — drag to rearrange
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Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via Vssadmin or WMIC (via process_creation)
Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via vssadmin
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Suspicious Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC or PowerShell (via process_creation)
Malicious Shadow Copy Deletion via WMI PowerShell (via ps_script)
Pivot detection · T1490 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.