Malicious Shai-Hulud Data Exfiltration Script Execution via Process Creation

ATT&CK techniques

Collection → Exfiltration

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
- T1119Automated Collection
C2
Exfiltration
- T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of the .dev-env/config.sh helper script through bash, the staging and exfiltration routine dropped by the Shai-Hulud worm. The script bundles harvested secrets and pushes them to attacker infrastructure, so its execution indicates active collection and exfiltration on a compromised developer or build host.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1567 — drag to rearrange

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Malicious Destructive Recursive Delete of Home Directory

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Malicious Shai-Hulud Data Exfiltration Script Execution via Process Creation

Pivot detection · T1567 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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