Malicious SharkBot Android Banking Trojan C2 via DGA Domain Suffix

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
dns_query
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-15
Updated
2026-10-15

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects DNS resolution of domains containing the unique SharkBot domain generation algorithm suffix used to locate command and control infrastructure as documented by NCC Group. The trojan falls back to algorithmically generated domains sharing a hardcoded token making that constant a high confidence indicator of infection.

Related detections9 linkedT1071.001 — drag to rearrange
Possible Team9 C2 via Emercoin bazar Domain Resolution
Suspicious Diamond Sleet Anomalous Microsoft Internet Explorer User Agent (via proxy)
Suspicious Diamond Sleet C2 via LambLoad Addon PHP URI Pattern (via proxy)
Malicious Sapphire Sleet curl to osascript Chain With mac-cur User-Agent (via process_creation)
Malicious Marbled Dust Backdoor Executing from Public Videos Directory
Suspicious NetSupport Manager Remote Client Execution (via process_creation)
Malicious PipeMagic Named Pipe Created for Modular Backdoor Communication
Possible C2 via Google Sheets API Using Formula Render Option by GRIDTIDE
Malicious BRICKSTORM C2 over WebSocket to Cloudflare Workers Domain (via proxy)
Malicious SharkBot Android Banking Trojan C2 via DGA Domain Suffix
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.