Malicious Startup Persistence via WindowsDefenderSync Shortcut (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-27
Updated
2026-10-27

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a shortcut named WindowsDefenderSync.lnk being written into a Windows Startup folder, the auto-run persistence dropped by Operation ShadowRecruit to launch its payload at every user logon. The Defender-themed shortcut name masquerades as a security component while ensuring the ControlR RAT survives reboots, so catching the Startup write reveals the persistence installation.

Related detections9 linkedT1547.001 — drag to rearrange
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Malicious Scheduled Task Masquerading as Windows Defender Sync via schtasks (via process_creation)
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Malicious PXA Stealer Archive Extraction via Renamed WinRAR images.png (via process_creation)
Malicious NimDoor Loader Persistence via Masqueraded Google Updater (via file_event)
Suspicious NetSupport client32 Persistence via Run Key from ProgramData
Suspicious Run Key Persistence Named NvidiaDriverUpdate (via registry_set)
Suspicious HTA File Dropped into Startup Folder
Malicious Startup Persistence via WindowsDefenderSync Shortcut (via file_event)
Pivot detection · T1547.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.