Malicious Switch User to Rogue Root-Equivalent Account troot (via process_creation)

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1136.001Local Account
Priv Esc
- T1548Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Defense Evasion
- T1548Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a switch-user operation targeting the troot account, the uid 0 backdoor account injected into /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow during exploitation of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager. Adversaries create and then assume this masqueraded root-equivalent account to maintain privileged access, so an su to troot is a strong sign of post-exploitation activity.

Reporting behind it

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Malicious Switch User to Rogue Root-Equivalent Account troot (via process_creation)

Pivot detection · T1136.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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