Malicious SYSTEM Persistence via Scheduled Task Running rundll32 at Startup (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-30
Updated
2026-10-30

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Defense Evasion

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects schtasks creating a SYSTEM-context ONSTART task whose action is rundll32 executing an exported function from a DLL in a public writable directory, the persistence mechanism used in the Cobalt Strike SOCKS LockBit intrusion. Adversaries chain a boot-triggered scheduled task with a rundll32 DLL export to reload their loader as SYSTEM after reboot, so this combination is a strong persistence and defense-evasion signal.

Related detections9 linkedT1053.005 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious Persistence via pcalua Launching rundll32 Control_RunDLL
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation Running DLL from ProgramData
Suspicious DanaBot Updater Scheduled Task Running Rundll32 from AppData via schtasks
Suspicious Scheduled Task Running rundll32 DllRegisterServer Every Minute
Malicious Rundll32 Executing Image File as DLL
Suspicious Per-Minute SYSTEM Scheduled Task With Highest Privileges
Malicious SYSTEM Persistence via Scheduled Task Running rundll32 at Startup (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1053.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.