Malicious TeamTNT prochider Rootkit Deployment as Shared Object (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
linux
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-06
Updated
2026-09-06

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Cred Access

  5. Discovery

  6. Lateral Movement

  7. Collection

  8. C2

  9. Exfiltration

  10. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the TeamTNT prochider rootkit being written to disk under the deceptive shared object names xmrig.so and systemd.so which are then loaded through the dynamic linker to hide the cryptominer process. These filenames are specific to the campaign tooling.

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Malicious TeamTNT prochider Rootkit Deployment as Shared Object (via file_event)
Pivot detection · T1014 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.