Malicious TELEPUZ DLL Persistence via Masqueraded Loader in User Path

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-16
Updated
2026-09-16

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects TELEPUZ writing its loader DLLs with system-sounding names into user-writable AppData or ProgramData locations. Legitimate components with these names live under System32, so the same filenames in a profile directory signal masquerading. This combination of trusted-looking name and wrong path exposes the DLL persistence.

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Malicious TELEPUZ DLL Persistence via Masqueraded Loader in User Path
Pivot detection · T1036.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.