huntrule

Malicious UAC Bypass via Fodhelper or ComputerDefaults Execution Hijack via Process Creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-17
Updated
2026-09-17
AnalysisDetection

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects child processes spawned by the auto-elevating fodhelper or computerdefaults binaries which is the hallmark of a registry based UAC bypass where an attacker hijacks the shell open command to launch an elevated process without a consent prompt. Any child of these settings handlers should be treated as suspicious elevation.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1548.002 — drag to rearrange
Malicious UAC Bypass via Eventvwr Execution Hijack via Process Creation
Malicious FodHelper UAC Bypass via ms-settings Shell Command Hijack (via registry_set)
Suspicious Banana RAT UAC Skip Environment Variable in PowerShell
Malicious UAC Bypass via sdclt Handler Hijack (via registry_set)
Malicious UAC Bypass via ms-settings Handler Hijack (via registry_set)
Malicious DBatLoader DLL Sideloading via easinvoker.exe Loading netutils.dll (via image_load)
Suspicious dllhost.exe Spawned with CLSID and Anomalous Parent (via process_creation)
Malicious ms-settings DelegateExecute UAC Bypass Registry Change
Malicious User Account Control Bypass via Auto-Elevating Binary Hijack (via process_creation)
Malicious UAC Bypass via Fodhelper or ComputerDefaults Execution Hijack via Process Creation
Pivot detection · T1548.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.