Malicious User Password Change Using Current Hash Password - ChangeNTLM - Mimikatz (via security)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-05
Updated
2026-09-05

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects resets a user account by using the compromised NTLM password hash. The newly clear text password defined by the attacker can be then used in order to login into services like Outlook Web Access (OWA), RDP, SharePoint... As ID 4723 refers to user changing is own password, the SubjectSid and TargetSid should be equal. However in a change initiated by Mimikatz, they will be different. Correlate the event ID 4723, 4624 and 5145 using the "SubjectLogonId" field to identify the source of the reset.

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Malicious Host Set with Unconstrained Delegation (via security)
Malicious Host Set with Constrained Delegation (via security)
Malicious User Password Change Using Current Hash Password - ChangeNTLM - Mimikatz (via security)
Pivot detection · T1098 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.