Malicious VoidLink Kernel Rootkit C2 Endpoints via HTTP (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-29
Updated
2026-10-29

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects HTTP requests to the handshake and compile endpoints of the VoidLink command and control server. VoidLink contacts these endpoints to register infected hosts and to request on demand compilation of kernel rootkit modules matched to the victim host. Traffic to these endpoints indicates active rootkit command and control.

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Malicious VoidLink Kernel Rootkit C2 Endpoints via HTTP (via proxy)
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.