Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Access via Mklink to GLOBALROOT

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-29
Updated
2026-09-29

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a symbolic link into a GLOBALROOT HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy device path, a technique Huntress observed for reading locked files such as SAM, SYSTEM, and NTDS.DIT from a volume shadow copy. Attackers use the shadow copy to bypass file locks and exfiltrate credential stores. Linking to a shadow copy device object is anomalous and indicates credential-store access.

Related detections9 linkedT1003.002 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Credential Hive Copy from Volume Shadow Copy
Windows Print.EXE Sensitive File Dump for Credential Access
Windows File Events: NTDS.DIT Created by Suspicious or Rare Process
Zeek SMB: Network Share File Transfers of Credential-Related Filenames
Zeek SMB Files: Impacket SecretDump Access to ADMIN$ and System32 .tmp Droppers
Windows Credential Dump Tool Artifacts Written to Disk via File Events
Windows Volume Shadow Copy Symlink Creation Using mklink
Windows Network Share File Transfers Targeting Credential and Memory Dump Paths
Windows Shadow Copy Creation via PowerShell/pwsh/wmic/vssadmin Commands
Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Access via Mklink to GLOBALROOT
Pivot detection · T1003.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.