Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via vssadmin

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-04
Updated
2026-10-04

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects deletion of volume shadow copies via vssadmin, an inhibit-recovery technique used by Snatch and many other ransomware families to prevent victims from restoring encrypted files. Legitimate administrative shadow copy deletion exists but is uncommon on endpoints. Combined with other ransomware indicators this behavior is high fidelity.

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Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via BlackSuit Ransomware
Malicious Boot Configuration Tampering to Disable Recovery via BlackSuit Ransomware
Malicious Boot Configuration Tampering via bcdedit
Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via WMI PowerShell
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Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via vssadmin
Pivot detection · T1490 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.