Malicious Vulnerable Driver Load for EDR Evasion (via image_load)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
image_load
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-18
Updated
2026-10-18

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects loading of the wnbios.sys or WN_64.sys vulnerable drivers, the bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver components an extortion actor paired with the EDRSandBlast disabler.exe tool to blind endpoint security. Loading a known-abusable signed driver grants kernel access used to unhook or terminate EDR agents.

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Malicious Vulnerable Driver Load for EDR Evasion (via image_load)
Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.