Malicious WHQL-Signed WFP Kernel Backdoor Driver Load via wskmon.sys (via driver_load)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
driver_load
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-06
Updated
2026-11-06

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects loading of the wskmon.sys kernel driver, the WHQL-signed Windows Filtering Platform network backdoor analyzed by Nextron that registers a stream callout to intercept traffic and execute operator commands from kernel space. Adversaries leverage a signed driver to persist beneath user-mode defenses, making early detection critical for surfacing kernel-resident implants before command execution.

Related detections9 linkedT1547.006 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Replaced Filesystem Helper Execution from Library Filesystems Bundle (via process_creation)
Suspicious Kernel Module Load From World Writable Directory on Linux
Suspicious Kernel Module Load Or Unload For Rootkit Deployment via PUMAKIT
Possible AF_ALG Privilege Escalation via algif_aead Module Load
Suspicious Kernel Extension Load on macOS (via process_creation)
Malicious Houken sysinitd Rootkit Kernel Module Load via insmod (via process_creation)
Suspicious Kernel Module Load via insmod on Linux (via process_creation)
Malicious Kernel Module Loaded From a User-Writable Path on Linux (via process_creation)
Malicious VoidLink Kernel Module Load via Insmod (via process_creation)
Malicious WHQL-Signed WFP Kernel Backdoor Driver Load via wskmon.sys (via driver_load)
Pivot detection · T1547.006 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.