Malicious Windows Defender Exclusion Added for PowerShell and conhost

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-10
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Add-MpPreference being used to register Windows Defender process exclusions for powershell or conhost. The ClipBanker campaign distributed through a trojanized Proxifier excluded its own living-off-the-land binaries from Defender scanning to run undetected as reported by Kaspersky. Adding process exclusions for these interpreters is a strong defense-evasion signal that precedes payload execution.

Related detections9 linkedT1685 — drag to rearrange
Windows Defender Tampering via Set-MpPreference and Exclusions
Suspicious Windows Defender Real-Time Protection Disabled via Policy Registry by Cephalus Ransomware
Suspicious Microsoft Defender Path Exclusion of User Directories (via process_creation)
Malicious Windows Defender Tampering via Set-MpPreference (via process_creation)
Malicious Container Runtime Tampering via chmod on runc (via process_creation)
In-Memory AMSI or ETW Bypass in PowerShell (via process_creation)
Malicious Microsoft Defender Critical Security Components Disabled - Command (via process_creation)
Malicious Microsoft Defender Service Deactivation Attempt - Command (via process_creation)
Malicious Wdigest Authentication Enabled - Reg via Command (via process_creation)
Malicious Windows Defender Exclusion Added for PowerShell and conhost
Pivot detection · T1685 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.