Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-03
Updated
2026-10-03

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects wevtutil being used to clear or reconfigure Windows event logs which Evil Corp operators perform to destroy forensic evidence of their intrusion. Clearing event logs is a deliberate anti forensic action that legitimate administrators rarely automate on endpoints.

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Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil (via process_creation)
Malicious Windows Event Log and Backup Clearing by BabLock Ransomware
Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via Wevtutil
Malicious Security Event Log Disabled via wevtutil
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via Wevtutil (via process_creation)
Suspicious Mass Windows Event Log Clearing via PowerShell (via ps_script)
Malicious Event Log Clear Attempt - Wmi (via process_creation)
Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil
Pivot detection · T1685.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.